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Worlds in the Everett interpretation
David Wallace
∗
This is a discussion of how we can understand the world-view given
to us by the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, and in
particular the roˆle played by the concept of ‘world’. The view pre-
sented is that we are entitled to use ‘many-worlds’ terminology even
if the theory does not specify the worlds in the formalism; this is
defended by means of an extensive analogy with the concept of an
‘instant’ or moment of time in relativity, with the lack of a preferred
foliation of spacetime being compared with the lack of a preferred
basis in quantum theory. Implications for identity of worlds over
time, and for relativistic quantum mechanics, are discussed.
Keywords: Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics — Everett inter-
pretation; Preferred Basis; Decoherence; Spacetime Foliation
1 Introduction
If we take unitary quantum mechanics seriously a´ la Everett (1957), the view
of reality which emerges is certainly not that of a single classical universe. But
is it a ‘many-worlds’ view (as DeWitt (1970) and Deutsch (1985) have argued)?
We can object to this view taken literally on many grounds: ontological extrav-
agance, difficulties with relativistic covariance, violation of the principle of the
identity of indiscernibles, the need to find an exactly preferred basis, etc.1 But if
we reject such a view then how are we to understand the Everett interpretation
— what metaphysical picture does it give us?
Looked at another way, defenders of an Everettian viewpoint face a dilemma:
just how seriously are we to take these worlds? On the one hand, if we were
to take them literally and build them into our formalism then we would face
the preferred-basis problem at its worst. Decoherence would be no use to us,
for we would need an exact world-defining principle and not some pragmatic
criterion. Furthermore, there seems to be no relativistically covariant way to
define a world, so this approach would push us towards the same problems with
1See Barrett (1999) for details of these criticisms.
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relativity faced by approaches like the pilot-wave theory (Bohm 1952; Holland
1993) or state-reduction theories (Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber 1986; Pearle
1989). On the other hand, if we banish these worlds from our formalism we
must answer the criticism that our theory is just uninterpreted mathematics,
and explain how sense can be made of the universal state.2
In this paper I shall attempt to defend three claims. The first is that Ev-
erettians can avoid this dilemma by a compromise: they may legitimately and
meaningfully use the terminology of many worlds without being required to rep-
resent these worlds in their formalism. The second claim is that this view of
Everett, rather than being either contradictory or a pathology confined to quan-
tum mechanics, is typical of what we should expect when interpreting a theory
which changes our concept of what the world is. The third claim is that devel-
oping such a view of quantum mechanics brings out a number of deep analogies
with the other twentieth century physical theory which radically changed our
concept of the world: relativity.
The second of these claims is defended in section 2, in which I shall argue that
any theory which revises our previous ways of understanding reality nevertheless
needs to make contact with these previous theories if we are to be able to
comprehend the new theory. These previous ways are wrong in some respects
(else we would not need the new theory!) so their use in an interpretation of
the new theory may be incomplete or obscure; nonetheless such use is essential
if the new theory is to be seen as a theory of physics. We may hope eventually
to come to understand a given theory without describing any of its concepts in
this way, but we cannot begin without any reference to what has gone before.
In section 3 the classical concept of relativistic spacetime is used as a con-
crete example of this process, but the main reason for discussing spacetime
extensively is to set the stage for a discussion of the profound analogies between
(relativistic) spacetime and the Everettian universal state. These analogies have
already been discussed — notably, and extensively, by Simon Saunders (1993,
1995, 1996b, 1997, 1998) — in the context of the probability problem in Ev-
erett interpretations.3 My approach is complementary to this (and I mention
probability only in passing): if we accept the Everett interpretation, we may
use the spacetime analogy to cast light on how we can describe and understand
the world-view it gives us. (A sort of converse also holds: if we insist that the
Everett interpretation is meaningful only with a preferred basis then we are
forced to accept that relativistic spacetime is meaningful only with a preferred
foliation.)
In the remainder of the paper I shall attempt to sketch out this approach,
and in doing so to defend my first and third claims. In section 4 I address
2In either case, of course, we must explain how to understand probability; but that problem
lies beyond the scope of this paper.
3The problem here is (at least in part) how to do without a criterion by which we can
individuate worlds and identify how they change over time, or how to provide one if it turns
out to be indispensable. Saunders, and Tappenden (2000a, 2000b), have argued that such a
criterion is not needed, and this view will be adopted here (see however Barrett (1999) for a
dissenting view, and Butterfield (1996) for further discussion).
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the problem of how we make sense of the Everett interpretation without an
exactly preferred basis, while in section 5 I discuss the question of the persis-
tence of worlds through time and in section 6 I discuss the role of the observer
in the Everett interpretation, and contrast the approach of this paper with
many-minds approaches. In sections 7–9 I consider how we are to understand
(special-)relativistic quantum theory, and in sections 10 and 11 I summarise the
approach.
2 Interpreting our Theories
What is spacetime? A mathematically motivated answer (see, e. g. , Wald
(1984)) might go something like
Spacetime is (or possibly, ‘is isomorphic to’) a set {M,g, φ1, . . . φn},
where M is a connected smooth paracompact 4-manifold, g is a
smooth symmetric 2-tensor field on TM, and the φi are further
tensor fields on M.
But given such a mathematical description, how are we to understand what
spacetime is? Assuredly we have to get such an understanding, for without any
way to interpret the mathematics as a description of the world our theory can
have neither predictive nor explanatory power. After all, suppose that we had
instead said that
Spacetime is a set containing exactly six elements, together with a
commutative group operation on that set of elements.
To object that this is nothing like spacetime, we need some inkling of what sort
of object this ‘spacetime’ actually is.
This sort of requirement is general to mathematical physics. To interpret a
mathematically-formulated theory as physics we need some way of linking the
mathematics to the physical world. At the least, this requires that we locate
ourselves somewhere in the theory, or else that we have some idea of how the
objects and concepts of our everyday world are mapped into the mathematics.
We are able to accept that, in the light of new theories, these objects and
concepts may turn out to be not exactly what they seem — and indeed some
may be completely illusory — but our theory needs at least to make contact
with them in order for us to do physics.
It is, however, important to remember that ‘our everyday world’ is not
something to which we have direct sensory access. The existence of a three-
dimensional spatial universe in which exist various macroscopic objects — in-
cluding ourselves — and which we learn about through vision, touch etc. is,
rather, an extremely effective theory (the ‘everyday theory’), which explains
and unifies our observations. This point is familiar from Quine’s writings (see,
e. g. , Quine 1966).
At first sight, it then seems that to interpret theories of physics by finding
the everyday world within them is to court infinite regress, for we would seem
required in turn to interpret the ‘everyday theory’ in terms of something yet
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more basic. (After all, once we have accepted it as a theory we may formalise
it in mathematical language every bit as forbidding as that used to describe
spacetime.4 As such, if we are required to explicate spacetime then why not our
theory of space?) It might appear that we would instead do better to link our
new theory directly to our observations — presumably if the new theory is an
improvement upon the ‘everyday theory’ it too will explain our observations,
only better.
The problem with this idea is that our observations are themselves inextri-
cably entwined with the theory of the everyday world. To take vision as an
example,5 it is a gross over-simplification to suppose that our visual field is sim-
ply a region of coloured patches rather like a television screen. Much low-level
processing of visual data takes place before it is presented to higher-order sub-
systems of the brain and begins to affect our actions (we might say ‘before we
are conscious of it’). For a start we have two eyes, and the parallax calculations
that tell us the distance to nearby objects appear to be made at a fairly early
stage of processing. We do not consciously work out distances to objects, we are
simply aware of their distances in addition to their angular positions. But there
is far more processing than this: identification of objects, making assumptions
about regions of the visual field that cannot be observed (such as the blind spot)
etc. , so the information presented is probably better described along the lines
of “there’s a book-case at 3 o’clock, 4 metres away to judge by the parallax, five
shelves, lots of multi-coloured books, all about thirty centimetres high” than by
a pixel-by-pixel description of the bookcase and the rest of the visual field.
So there are no theory-neutral observations: rather, there is an existing
theory in terms of which our observations are automatically interpreted, and
which we must take as our starting point when interpreting the theories of
physics.6 It should come as no surprise that we are capable of comprehending
4“Everyday space is a smooth three-manifold together with a smooth symmetric two-tensor
g, whose unique associated metric-compatible symmetric connection has zero holonomy, . . . ”.
5This discussion is based on material taken from Dennett (1991b).
6This is not a novel view; for an example of a similar viewpoint, consider Einstein (reported
in Heisenberg (1971, pages 63–64)):
It is quite wrong to try founding a theory on observable magnitudes alone. In
reality the very opposite happens. It is the theory which decides what we can
observe. You must appreciate that observation is a very complicated process.
The phenomenon under observation produces certain events in our measuring
apparatus. As a result, further processes take place in the apparatus, which
eventually and by complicated paths produce sense impressions and help us to fix
the effects in our consciousness. Along this whole path—from the phenomenon
to its fixation in our consciousness—we must be able to tell how nature functions,
must know the natural laws at least in practical terms, before we can claim to
have observed anything at all. Only theory, that is, knowledge of natural laws,
enables us to deduce the underlying phenomena from our sense impressions.
When we claim that we can observe something new, we ought really to be saying
that, although we are about to formulate new natural laws that do not agree
with the old ones, we nevertheless assume that the existing laws—covering the
whole path from the phenomenon to our consciousness—function in such a way
that we can rely upon them and hence speak of “observation.”
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this theory directly, for we are evolved to live in a universe described reasonably
well by it, and so it is hardwired into our brains. New theories of physics do not
have this advantage: perhaps through long exposure to them we might come
to have a similarly direct grasp of them (rather than understand them only via
the existing theory) but this may not be possible at all and certainly will not
be possible when we are first presented with the new theories.
To summarise, then, our program for interpreting a new theory is inevitably
dependent on an existing theory whose interpretation we are assumed to un-
derstand already (such an existing theory will either be our everyday theory of
bodies, or will in turn be interpreted by means of that theory). The requirement
is that certain parts of the new theory must be ‘approximately isomorphic’ to
the existing theory.7 The isomorphism may be imperfect, revealing parts of
our old theory to be in error, and our understanding of the old theory may be
greatly transformed, but it seems that a recognisable shadow of the old theory
must exist in the new one for it to be more than just mathematics.
(For reasons of space I shall not develop the links between this material and
the closely related questions of how we are to understand theory change and in
what sense one theory can be contained within another. The approach adopted
here, however, has much in common with the structural realist program in the
philosophy of science (see Worrall 1989; Psillos 1995; Ladyman 1998).)
3 Relativistic Spacetime and the ‘Many-instants’ Interpretation
To illustrate this view of theories, let us return to the question raised at the
start of the last section: how are we to understand (Minkowski) spacetime?8
One natural way to do so makes essential use of the concepts of space and time,
regarded initially as separate. One can say of any given event that it is in
a given place, at a given time — the former property being represented by a
point in three-dimensional space, the latter by a single number. As a matter
of mathematics, then, we can construct a four-dimensional ‘space’ (using the
word in its mathematical sense) which consists of all points in space, at all
times. This space is a stack of the various spaces each of which is space as we
ordinarily understand it, at a given time. This might be called a ‘many-instants’
interpretation of spacetime: spacetime is the collection of all instants of time,
together with a metric structure connecting them and representing the time
elapsed between instants.
On understanding better this metric structure — specifically, on recognizing
its Lorentzian symmetries — we see that this description of spacetime obscures
its nature in many ways. For a start, it is clear that any given way of slicing it
up is arbitrary, and that many other choices of simultaneity could be made. (In
more mathematical language we are saying that given a relativistic spacetime,
7The reader may, if desired, interpret this as saying that models of the existing theory
must be approximately isomorphic to parts of models of the new theory.
8Throughout this paper, ‘spacetime’ means Minkowski spacetime, though most of what I
have to say applies to any relativistic spacetime. When quantum field theory is discussed,
however, the spacetime metric will be assumed to be fixed and classical: quantum gravity will
not be discussed.
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we can make sense of what that spacetime is by considering a global foliation
— but that no such foliation is the preferred choice.) This becomes worse when
we start to interpret simultaneity in the spirit of general relativity: that is,
entirely as an artificial construction. We then realise that there are a multitude
of spacelike slices, identical in our vicinity, which differ from one another at
greater distances.
The situation seems to worsen when we remember the theoretical nature of
our concept of space. After all, the surface we perceive through our eyes is not
spacelike at all: it is the past light-cone, which does not bear much concep-
tual resemblance to our ordinary concept of space (in particular, it has wholly
the wrong causal structure). And furthermore, our everyday understanding of
‘space’ comes with the understanding that we are represented in it, that our
conscious thoughts supervene on some region of space. But barring radical du-
alism, our thoughts presumably must supervene on some processes in our brains
— and processes take finite time to occur, and occupy finite space.9 Hence our
thoughts supervene on regions of spacetime — so if we regard spacetime as a
collection of instants, we have to face up to the fact that a single conscious
thought supervenes on many instants (‘many moments of time’) rather than
just one.
So, as a description of spacetime the many-instants interpretation leaves
much to be desired: it contains arbitrariness, obscures structural features, and
we ourselves cannot be said to exist in any single given instant. Nonetheless it is
a description with merits. Specifically, it is a complete description: once we have
specified all the contents of all the instants of time and the temporal relations
between instants, we have the entire spacetime. Further, we have an existing
intuitive grasp of what an instant of time is like, and from this we can gain
some understanding of what sort of entity spacetime is. This understanding is
enough to make contact between our experiences and the formalism of relativity,
granting the theory predictive and explanatory power.
Furthermore, for everyday purposes (i. e. when we confine ourselves to re-
9I regard this point as uncontroversial. I do not claim that this finite extent of (the object
of supervenience of) our thoughts is of the order of the ‘specious present’ — it may well be
that the ‘finite time’ of these processes to be measured in nanoseconds — but if we want to
hold to any sort of functionalist view of the brain then we’re going to be stuck with some
finite duration.
I suppose it’s possible, given our limited understanding of the nature of consciousness, to
imagine that our thoughts actually supervene on instantaneous states of the brain, rather than
processes. But this seems highly implausible: the brain still has nonzero spatial extent so the
objects of supervenience would have to be some specific 3-slices of the world-tube of the brain,
and it is hard to imagine a plausible method to describe exactly which slicing to choose —
eventually any method based on, say, Lorentz frames will need to make arbitrary choices of
exactly how we define the brain, and in any case it seems hard to motivate such an exact rule.
It might be more plausible for the objects of supervenience to be only approximately defined,
in which case they could perfectly well be states of the brain — after all neurologists talk
perfectly sensibly about ‘the current state of a brain’ without worrying about the difficulties
of defining precisely the choice of simultaneity hypersurface which they wish to use — but in
a certain sense we’d still supervene on many instants at once. If we do wish to defend a claim
of supervenience on an instant, a substantial metaphysical package would seem to be required
— such as that developed by Barbour (1999).
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gions of modest size and modest velocities) there is a pragmatically preferred
foliation, a pragmatically preferred way to regard spacetime as a collection of
instants: that foliation defined by the Lorentz frame appropriate to our current
state of motion. Granted that it is irrelevant whether at large distances we
choose to let the foliation deviate from the Lorentzian choice; granted that if we
look closely enough we will need to make arbitrary choices as to whether to take
a Lorentz frame appropriate to, say, the velocity of Oxford or of a plane flying
over it. For everyday purposes the preferred foliation is effectively well-defined.
It is here, in the elements of this foliation, that we find those entities approxi-
mately isomorphic to the three-dimensional spaces of our everyday world-view.
Note here how important it is that we identify our everyday view of the
world as a theory: if we did see ourselves as having direct access to it we would
have to map it onto the past light-cone and not some spatial hypersurface. As
it is, though, we can claim to have identified ordinary space (approximately) in
our new theory, which tells us how in the new theory to describe the universe
we observe and how to locate ourselves in the theory.
To say that spacetime
is an entity with such-and-such mathematical description which can
be thought of as a collection of all instantaneous spaces together with
the metric relations between them, no matter that it may be decom-
posed into such a collection in many different ways
is an inelegant way of describing it. But it is an accurate one, and since Nature
and our early education have not seen fit to provide us with a direct intuitive
grasp of what spacetime is we must begin with such inelegant ways to understand
it. Ideally we might, through working with the spacetime concept, develop a
direct understanding of it, in which case this ladder can be kicked away. But I
doubt that we are yet sufficiently at ease with the concept to allow this.
4 Quantum Theory
The connection with Everett should be fairly clear. Everett’s essential postulate
is that the quantum state, and its unitary evolution, are universal; but this leaves
us with another forbiddingly unintuitive mathematical description (Haag 1996):
The universal state is a set {H,M, φ̂1, . . . φ̂n, ρ} where H is a sep-
arable Hilbert space, M is a spacetime, the φ̂i are (distributional)
maps from M to the algebra of bounded operators on H, and ρ is a
self-adjoint bounded operator on H of trace 1.
Without some idea of how to interpret this entity we clearly cannot treat it as
physics.
In trying to understand what the Everett interpretation implies we typically
begin in the middle, presuming various concepts already understood. We might
for instance begin with Schro¨dinger’s cat, and suppose some subsystem of the
universe to be described by a Hilbert space H which is the tensor product of
spaces describing a radioactive atom, a Geiger counter, a cat, and some auxiliary
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apparatus (the box, the cat-killing device, etc.). We also suppose that there are
some states in these component spaces which represent definitely decayed or
undecayed atoms, triggered or untriggered counters, dead or alive cats, and so
forth.
Note how extensively we use the concepts of our previous theory. In par-
ticular we suppose that we know what is meant by an alive or dead cat, or a
triggered or untriggered counter — it is superpositions of systems in such states
that we want to understand.
Following the steps of Schro¨dinger’s thought experiment, we know that the
unitary dynamics will lead to some evolution like10∣∣∣∣ atomundecayed
〉∣∣∣∣ counteruntriggered
〉∣∣∣∣ poisonin vial
〉∣∣∣∣ catalive
〉
−→ (1)
1√
2
(∣∣∣∣ atomdecayed
〉∣∣∣∣ countertriggered
〉∣∣∣∣ poisonreleased
〉∣∣∣∣ catdead
〉
+∣∣∣∣ atomundecayed
〉∣∣∣∣ counter stillnot triggered
〉∣∣∣∣ poison stillin vial
〉∣∣∣∣ cat stillalive
〉)
Further, our prequantum theories give us adequate understanding of the
processes∣∣∣∣ atomundecayed
〉∣∣∣∣ counteruntriggered
〉∣∣∣∣ poisonin vial
〉∣∣∣∣ catalive
〉
−→
∣∣∣∣ atomundecayed
〉∣∣∣∣ counter stillnot triggered
〉∣∣∣∣ poison stillin vial
〉∣∣∣∣ cat stillalive
〉
and
∣∣∣∣ atomdecayed
〉∣∣∣∣ counteruntriggered
〉∣∣∣∣ poisonin vial
〉∣∣∣∣ catalive
〉
−→
∣∣∣∣ atomdecayed
〉∣∣∣∣ countertriggered
〉∣∣∣∣ poisonreleased
〉∣∣∣∣ catdead
〉
.
It is then tempting to interpret (1) as describing the evolution of two (or two
sets of identical) parallel worlds, both primarily evolving in a classical way but
sometimes interfering with one another. This temptation is strengthened when
we put ourselves into the formalism: a human observer of the cat becomes entan-
gled with it, and the universal state is a superposition of definite observations.
10The reason for distinguishing “counter untriggered” from “counter still not triggered” (and
similarly for the cat and the vial) is somewhat pedantic: being macroscopic systems, these
objects will inevitably evolve to some degree over any time interval (the cat will metabolise
food, for instance). In fact, strictly speaking it is unlikely to be correct even to regard these
macroscopic objects as pure states: realistically they will be significantly entangled both with
the environment and with each other.
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As was mentioned in the Introduction, there are serious problems with taking
this parallel-worlds viewpoint literally; let us see how these play out in more
detail. The greatest difficulty is probably the need to specify which states
describe single worlds and which describe superpositions of them. The only
way to answer this question — if we take the individual worlds as ontologically
primary — is to specify a ‘preferred basis’ ({|i〉}, say) for the universal Hilbert
space. Then any state |ψ〉 can be expressed in terms of this basis:
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
αi |i〉
and interpreted as a collection of parallel worlds (indexed by i) each of weight
αi.
Four problems present themselves. Firstly what do we mean by the phrase
“each of weight αi”? It is not sufficient to take it as saying that the fraction
of world i in the collective is |αi|2, since this discards the relative phases of the
component worlds, which play an important roˆle in the theory.
Secondly, how is this {|i〉} basis selected? To justify the reasoning which
led us to Everett in the first place, it had better be a basis whose members
are not states describing macroscopic objects as delocalised, but this restriction
is far from enough to specify it. Making some choice by fiat is hard to moti-
vate: the configuration-space basis is one obvious choice, but violates relativistic
covariance by requiring a preferred reference frame.11
The third and fourth problems concern the fact that these ‘worlds’ do not
have all of the properties of worlds in the prequantum sense. Our third problem
is that they are instantaneous: we may decompose the universal state into worlds
at some given instant of time, but we cannot track the individual worlds when
we evolve the state forward in time in any satisfactory way. All we can say is
that world 14 increases in weight, while worlds 15 and 16 decrease and world
17 changes phase, etc. but we have no classical notion of one set of definite
properties passing into another. (To see this, suppose that the state |ψ〉, above,
has evolved over time t into a new state
|ψ′〉 =
∑
i
α′i |i〉 ;
if each |i〉 represents a world which evolves over time then we need some notion
that world |i〉 has evolved over time t into some other world |i′〉, but the for-
malism of quantum mechanics will not give us this — it just tracks the change
in weights of the time-invariant states |i〉. To recover such a notion would (as
11There’s also a slightly subtler problem with this choice: generalised to field theory, the
“position” basis becomes the basis of definite field configurations. But this basis fails to de-
scribe macroscopic objects properly, since they are made up of particles, which are specific
superpositions of field-configuration eigenstates. Choosing a basis of definite particle loca-
tions in QFT is also problematic (Saunders 1992), because (i) the concept of location is only
approximate for relativistic particles; (ii) given mass renormalisation, which states describe
particles depends on the energy at which we observe; (iii) in general spacetimes, the particle
basis cannot be exactly defined even for free quantum fields.
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Barrett (1999) has argued) require us to supplement unitary quantum mechan-
ics with not only a preferred basis, but also some auxiliary dynamical rules —
but by this stage we are far from the Everett interpretation per se.)
The fourth problem is that our thoughts do not supervene on individual
worlds any more than they do on individual moments of time: whether we
identify the objects of supervenience as states or processes of the brain, the
projector onto (neurologically) functionally identical brain states will be very
high-dimensional — for how can it matter to neurology whether a certain elec-
tron in my frontal lobe is displaced by 10−15 metres? For all the richness of
human experience, there surely cannot be enough distinct conscious states to
correspond one-to-one with the number of orthogonal states corresponding to
a working brain; I shall argue that (at least if we are functionalists) this forces
us to identify thoughts as supervening on facts about certain regions in large
numbers of similar but non-identical worlds.12
Why are we forced to such an identification? If the worlds did not interact
at all then we could possibly avoid it: it is at least defensible to suppose that
there exist many distinct non-interacting worlds containing many distinct but
functionally identical copies of me.13 The problem is that for any simple choice
of the preferred basis, interference between different terms in the basis is vital to
the dynamics of the processes in my brain (or indeed any macroscopic object).
If we choose the position basis as preferred, for instance, we might decompose a
certain brain state (describing my brain in a certain definite configuration) into
position eigenstates and suppose that each is a separate conscious entity. But if
one such eigenstate were isolated from the rest (if an external observer measured
the position of all brain constituents, for instance) then that state would evolve
rapidly into organic soup and certainly would cease to be a functioning brain.14
Hence if mental facts are supervenient on facts about brain configurations in
single worlds then each of us remains a thinking being only because of constant
interference from the particles comprising the brains of countless neurologically
identical parallel-world copies of ourselves. This is possibly not an untenable
view (so long as we hold on to the idea of worlds as fundamental) but to me it
seems an unattractive one. (The only way to avoid this problem would be to take
the preferred basis as a decoherence basis (see section 5) for the brain, in which
case interference between the different terms will be negligible — but this would
require the use of detailed biochemical and neurophysiological criteria to specify
what is supposed to be a basis which is preferred at the level of basic ontology,
and even then the interference terms will not be completely eliminated.)
12Such an identification has previously been argued for by Donald (1997):
In as far as there are such sets of identical experiences, I would associate them
with the same mind. [Donald’s emphasis]
13In fact, this viewpoint is held by modal realists such as Lewis (1986).
14In case this is not obvious, consider the bonds holding together the molecules of the brain:
each is made up of various electrons in highly delocalised states. A localised electron, then, is
conversely in a superposition of binding, and not binding, a given pair of atoms. Breaking a
significant fraction of the bonds in every complex molecule in the brain would probably not
be the only deleterious effect of a position measurement, but it will do for a start.
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This is to say nothing of what lies outside my skull — but if some object
many light years away is in a superposition of two preferred-basis states then
taking the worlds literally implies that there are two sets of parallel worlds
with the copies of my brain in one set identical to the copies in the other set.
In this situation are there two identical versions of me, or should I regard my
thoughts as supervening on both simultaneously? There will obviously be no
detectable difference between these two viewpoints, but in the former the state
of the faraway object will be determinate but unknown and in the latter there
will be no fact of the matter about its state.
Generally speaking, modern versions of Everett get round this problem as
follows: they abandon the idea of specifying a preferred basis explicitly, and
then recover it — in an approximate or pragmatic sense — from the state
and the dynamics by one consideration or another. The usual consideration
— and the one which will be adopted here — is decoherence theory (Zurek
1991; Saunders 1995), which tells us that subsystems of the world will have
‘states’ (i. e. reduced density operators) diagonalized with respect to a certain
basis, and that attempts to prepare these subsystems in states not belonging to
this basis will be virtually impossible. The basis thus determined, however, is
approximate: many choices of basis will satisfy the decoherence property with
(for instance) the choice of basis for the spin of a given electron being irrelevant
unless that electron’s spin is entangled with some macroscopic system (such as
a Stern-Gerlach apparatus).15
But in rejecting any idea of worlds as ontologically primary, we have returned
to the problem at the beginning of this section: if the state is fundamental, how
are we to understand it? Hopefully the parallels with spacetime are clear, and
their implications equally so: we are to understand the universal state as
an entity with such-and-such mathematical description which can be
thought of as a collection of instantaneous worlds together with their
Hilbert-space amplitudes, no matter that it may be decomposed into
such a collection in many different ways.
As with the instants of spacetime, the point is not that we are directly presented
with worlds of definite particle position through our senses (we aren’t, or not
exactly), nor that we ourselves live in a single such world (we don’t) but that we
have a conceptual grasp on the idea of such worlds. We can regard the universal
state as being made up of worlds and their amplitudes in the same way that we
can regard spacetime as made up of instants and their metric relations: neither
description really does justice to the symmetries of the entity being described,
but both give enough data completely to specify the entity and both give us a
conceptual grasp of what this entity is.
In this way, the analogy with spacetime and the many-instants view allows
supporters of Everett to answer the charge that, without some explicitly pre-
15Furthermore, it is possible that it is to some extent anthropocentric: it is impossible for
functional systems like us to prepare the subsystems in states not belonging to the basis, but
it remains unproven that other, wildly different systems would face the same restriction. I am
grateful to Simon Saunders for this point.
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ferred basis, their world-view simply does not make sense (as distinct from the
question of whether, for instance, it is empirically valid). For the idea of a uni-
versal state regarded as ontologically prior to worlds makes no more and no less
sense than the idea of spacetime regarded as ontologically prior to instants of
time, and if we insist that the Everett interpretation requires a preferred basis
to make sense then we ought to insist also that relativity requires a preferred
foliation.16
5 Consistent Histories and the Persistence of Worlds
Let us examine the concept of this “effectively preferred basis” more carefully.
A basis {|i〉} can equally be expressed as a partition of unity
1̂ =
∑
i
P̂ i
where P̂ i projects onto the one-dimensional subspace spanned by |i〉. We can
characterise such partitions as being a collection of projectors which
1. sum to unity;
2. are mutually orthogonal, P̂ iP̂ j = 0 for i 6= j; and
3. project onto one-dimensional subspaces.
We can then understand the idea of an “approximate basis” mentioned above
by dropping the third of these requirements. Decoherence specifies such a col-
lection of projectors, and it is an approximate basis in the sense that any exact
basis which (regarded as a resolution of unity) is a fine-graining17 of this collec-
tion, will consist of states which are stable against the decoherence process. By
this, we mean that even if at some time a state (expressed as a density operator)
is not block-diagonalized by the decoherence projectors, the off-block-diagonal
matrix elements of the operator will decay on a vanishingly short timescale
compared to the timescale on which the block-diagonal matrix elements evolve.
The information encoded in the off-diagonal states disappears into entanglement
between states of macroscopic systems and is effectively inaccessible;
As is well known, the consistent histories formalism (Griffiths 1984; Gell-
Mann and Hartle 1990; see Kent (1998) for a recent review) abstracts this
requirement and frees it from direct reference to subsystems and to the deco-
herence process. A consistent history space is, roughly, a collection of coarse-
grained bases (with the collection indexed by time, so that there is one basis for
each moment of time18). The consistency condition ensures that we can apply
16It might be argued that Barbour (1999) requires both: his metaphysics (for reasons con-
nected to spacetime relationism and quantum gravity) includes both a preferred foliation and
a choice of configuration space as the preferred basis.
17If we have two resolutions of the identity {Q̂i} and {P̂ j}, the latter is a fine-graining of
the former if each Q̂i is a sum of some of the P̂ j .
18Actually, in practice we often discretise time rather than using the continuum.
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classical probability to the events described by the projectors in these bases (in
the sense that each history can be assigned a probability, and if history A is a
coarse-graining of histories B1, . . . Bn then the probability of history A is the
sum of the probabilities of its component histories).
The problem given rise to by this abstraction is that there exist many choices
of consistent history space, but if we follow Everett and keep the state as funda-
mental there is no problem. Just as our choice of world-decomposition (i. e. fine-
grained basis) is made for ease of description rather than more fundamental
reasons, so our choice of history space is just made so as to give a convenient
description of the quantum universe. In fact there will be a subset of history
spaces which are much more convenient: we are information-processing sys-
tems, and it can be shown that any such system picks out a consistent history
space (Saunders 1993). (Reverting to the subsystem description given earlier,
the point is (in part) that such a system needs to store memories and if it chooses
an encoding of memories into states which are not diagonal in the decoherence
basis, they will not last long (Halliwell 1993; Zurek 1991).) So for describing
events in our vicinity, at least, there is an overwhelmingly preferred choice. As
with the pragmatically preferred reference frames of relativistic spacetimes, the
preference is only approximate and really only extends to our spatial vicinity: if
we wish to pick a truly global, fine-grained basis then there will be considerable
arbitrariness.
Let us now reconsider the four problems with many-worlds identified in the
previous section. Of these, three have close analogues in the many-instants de-
scription of spacetime: in describing reality there is neither an uniquely best set
of instants, nor of worlds; we cannot recover spacetime from its instants with-
out their temporal relations any more than we can recover the universal state
from the worlds without their amplitudes; and mental facts supervene neither
on facts about a single instant nor about a single world. Hence if we accept
the many-instants description of spacetime regardless, none of these problems
prevent us taking the Everett interpretation seriously, nor explicating it (with
appropriate care) in terms of worlds.
However, the third problem identified in section 4 remains: the (fine-grained)
worlds in a superposition are instantaneous, and we have not yet addressed the
question of how (or whether) we can track a given world from moment to mo-
ment. But this situation should be familiar to us from spacetime physics: there,
too, the notion of a persisting object is not directly present in the formalism.
However, the notion can emerge given a sufficiently ordered spacetime: we may
be able to pick out ‘world-tubes’ of fairly stable matter configurations, and de-
clare different three-dimensional slices of that tube to be the same object at
different times. This concept may not be definable with arbitrary precision
(how much is an object allowed to change before ceasing to count as the same
object?) and will not be applicable if the spacetime is not ordered enough for
persistent world-tubes to exist; nonetheless it is useful.
We can use the same pragmatic concept of continuance to make sense (in
certain circumstances) of the idea of identifying worlds across time. In neutron
interferometry, for instance, we have a neutron in a linear superposition of two
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spatially separated wave-packets. Until they are brought back together again
these packets do not overlap, so the evolution of each packet in position space
can be treated independently, without allowing for interference between the two,
and so we can reasonably describe the neutron as being in a superposition of
two histories, each fairly well-defined. This makes it reasonable to speak of
two persisting worlds, each describing one neutron. (See Vaidman (1998) for a
detailed discussion of neutron interferometry in the Everett interpretation, from
a related viewpoint.) Of course it is vital to remember that this language does
not describe anything fundamental in the theory, and that it will fail in certain
circumstances (in this example, it will fail when the two neutron beams are
brought back together again, so that interference occurs between the two worlds)
or when looked at too closely (in the example, we may speak of two persisting
worlds, but the worlds are fairly coarse-grained). Nonetheless the concept of
persisting worlds may be useful in certain explanatory contexts (rather like the
concept of ‘living creature’ in biology, or ‘star’ in astrophysics, neither of which
have an unambiguous definition or are written directly into the formalism19).
In this context we see the consistent-histories formalism from another view-
point: consistency gives a criterion for (coarse-grained) worlds for which there
exists a fairly robust notion of persistence. By ‘fairly robust’ I mean that al-
though we may need to speak of worlds splitting20 and (in thermodynamically
implausible circumstances) recombining, we do not have to deal with the inter-
ference between worlds that generally makes persistence meaningless.
6 The Status of the Observer
As was stated in the previous section, if we have a consistent-history basis (at
time t) {Q̂i(t)} then it is constrained by the requirement that our brains (being
information-processors) carry out this processing in such a basis. Then I can
identify a set of projectors {R̂j} which are a coarse-graining of {Q̂i(t)} and which
project onto functionally distinct states of my brain.21 This set of projectors
is not a resolution of the identity, since that would be to assert that my brain
exists with probability one; furthermore it is very coarse-grained in comparison
with {Q̂i(t)}. After all, specifying a set of projectors onto states of my brain
does not involve giving any information about the rest of the universe.
We now have a three-level description of the quantum state.
At the lowest level, we have a description in terms of Everett worlds,
i. e. by means of a fine-grained basis. It is at this level that we are giving a
complete description of the state; nonetheless these worlds are instantaneous
19See Deutsch (1997) and Dennett (1991a) for further discussion of this issue.
20The idea of worlds splitting will obviously lead to ideas of a one-many criterion for identity
over time, both for the worlds and for the macroscopic objects within them. Though there
are objections to such criteria, especially as regards the interpretation of probability (see,
e. g. , Barrett (1999)), they have been discussed in detail elsewhere (in particular by Saunders
(1998) and Tappenden (2000b)) and will not be dealt with further here.
21If we are interested in questions of supervenience, it may well be that mental facts are
supervenient upon facts about processes, not states. In this case we would need to consider
sequences of coarse-grainings.
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entities with no traceable histories, and there is a high degree of arbitrariness
about the choice of basis.22
The arbitrariness is not complete, however, since to be practically useful this
basis must be a fine-graining of some decoherence basis, which will in turn
be given by some choice of consistent history space. At this level of the descrip-
tion we can talk usefully of histories, describing a branching (and occasionally
recombining, in principle but not in practice) set of worlds. This is the level
at which we obtain a useful classical limit. However a description of the world
at this level is not complete, since the coarse-grained nature of the decoherence
basis means that information is lost.
In turn, the choice of consistent history space is motivated by anthropic
considerations: we are information-processing systems and as such must be
embedded in some consistent history space in which this information processing
takes place (Halliwell 1993; Saunders 1993). As such a useful choice of consistent
history space must be a fine-graining (at each moment of time, or for each short
space of time if we wish to think of thoughts supervening on processes rather
than states) of the basis of functionally distinct brain states. At this level
our description of the state is highly incomplete. However, at least from an
epistemological view point if the universal state is |ψ〉 and I am in brain state j
(with R̂j being the projector onto this state) then I should regard the state of
the Universe relative to me as given (up to normalisation) by R̂j |ψ〉.
Note the contrast between the way in which observers are recovered from
unitary quantum mechanics in this sort of approach (and in the closely related
approaches of, e. g. , Saunders (1996a), Zurek (1991), Gell-Mann and Hartle
(1990)), compared to the approach taken by many-minds theorists like Lock-
wood (1989, 1996a) or Donald (1995, 1997, 1999).23 In the latter approach,
the projectors R̂j are introduced from the outset, and the interpretation is con-
structed in terms of them; in the former, the job of physics is taken to be the
recovery of a quasiclassical domain and the problem of consciousness is then
handed over to other disciplines.
To some extent, reasons for pursuing one or other scheme come down to
differences of opinion about how successful certain scientific or philosophical
programs will be, so that decoherence-based approaches depend on the success
of the decoherence program to succeed formally in recovering an approximately
classical physics, while many-minds theorists can ignore this program but are
instead committed to certain quite strong physical or philosophical views about
consciousness (so Lockwood’s approach requires there to be a fact of the matter
as to which physical systems possess consciousness bases,24 while Donald (1995)
22As Mermin (1998) has shown, we can equally well give a description at this level in
terms of local events and the correlations between them: given any resolution of a system into
subsystems, knowing the correlations between observables in the subsystems gives us sufficient
information to recover the state.
23Albert and Loewer (1988), though they also advocate a many-minds theory, differ from
Lockwood and Donald in that they add explicit extra structure in the form of continuing
minds.
24cf. Lockwood (1996b):
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has constructed explicit models of observers and holds that this is a necessary
part of interpreting Everett25).
It is obviously far too early to say which way these longstanding contro-
versies will resolve themselves; however, section 2 seems to give some support
to the decoherence approach: whether or not mind turns out to be essential
in interpreting quantum mechanics, we will have to recover a quasiclassical do-
main anyway to make contact with existing theories and so interpret quantum
theory as a theory of physics. If there are no theory-neutral observations, then
saving the observed phenomena requires us to save (something approximately
isomorphic to) the theory.
I mention in passing an ambiguity about our choice of R̂j . These projectors
are designed to pick out my brain, but how is that to be done? Presumably
my thoughts can be instantiated in many different physical media; they can
certainly exist in many different spatial locations and be composed of different
atoms, so requiring them to project onto a given subsystem’s Hilbert space isn’t
really plausible. Presumably I have to use some intrinsic structural features,
but there seems to be an arbitrariness as to how great a personality-shift can
be tolerated before a given projector should actually be counted as projecting
onto someone else’s brain state. This is, of course, the old problem of personal
identity in quantum-mechanical guise.
7 Covariant Quantum Mechanics
So far, we have constructed an analogy between spacetime, and the quantum
state at a given time. However, talking of worlds at a given time obviously
implies a choice of reference frame and a breaking of covariance, whereas one of
the major motivations for adopting the Everett approach is its claim to provide
a quantum mechanics which is compatible with relativity. Accordingly, we now
turn to the problem of understanding relativistic quantum theory.
The mathematical structure given for quantum field theory at the beginning
of section 4 is fully covariant, since it is written in the Heisenberg formalism
so that its states are not dependent on time. Hence we have an uninterpreted
I regard it as a straightforward matter of fact whether cats or (a more seriously
contentious issue) prawns are sentient. Thus it’s not, as I see it, a matter of how
we define our terms, but whether there’s a ‘what it’s like to be’ a cat or a prawn
[. . . ]
If, in fact, the correct theory of consciousness were to be a much less all-or-nothing affair
(e. g. Dennett (1996):
the features [of animal consciousness] we have examined seem to make their ap-
pearance not just gradually but in an unsynchronised, inconsistent and patchy
fashion, both in evolutionary history and in the development of individual or-
ganisms.)
it would presumably have a significant impact on Lockwood’s theory.
25cf. Donald (1997):
[. . . ] the proper task of an analysis of quantum theory is to give an exact
definition of the possible physical manifestations of an observer.
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object — the state ρ — which has the properties we require. To describe this
object we can combine the many-worlds and many-instants descriptions:
The universal state is an object with such-and-such mathematical
description which can be described as a collection of sets of worlds,
together with the temporal metric relations between sets and the am-
plitudes of individual worlds within each set, no matter that the uni-
versal state can be decomposed into such a collection in many differ-
ent ways.
There is an attempt to illustrate this viewpoint on page 277 of Deutsch (1997),
although this illustration gives the impression that individual worlds have histo-
ries (i. e. that it is possible to say that this world in this instantaneous collection
of worlds is the future version of that world in that collection). This is consistent
with Deutsch’s explicit introduction of a preferred basis in Deutsch (1985), and
with the ‘continuing minds’ of Albert and Loewer (1988) (in both of which there
exist persisting objects — be they minds or worlds — which are stochastically
partitioned as the wave-function evolves), but contrasts with the view presented
here, in which persisting worlds are an approximate and derived notion. (Ob-
viously we could justify such a description in this framework by working at the
level of consistent histories, but then we cease to have a complete description of
the full instantaneous collection.) Deutsch also makes the speculative suggestion
(inspired by canonical quantum gravity and by the work of Page and Wootters
(1983); see also Barbour (1999)) that this two-axis collection of worlds can be
collapsed into a single collection — in other words, that different instants can
be understood as different Everett worlds — but this remains controversial, and
lies beyond the scope of this paper.
It must be admitted that our description of the universal state, given as
it is in terms of global instants of time and worlds defined at those instants,
is somewhat unaesthetic. In the next two sections I shall develop a somewhat
modified version which better reflects relativistic covariance, and then consider
an important strength of our existing description.
8 Spacetime as the Set of Events
One partial method of emancipating special-relativistic physics from the lan-
guage of space-at-an-instant is to see it as the set of events and the spatiotem-
poral relations between them.26 This approach deserves mention here, as it
succeeds partially in conveying a direct intuition of relativistic spacetime but is
still reliant in many ways on our prerelativistic intuitions.
The easiest way to see this is to look more closely at the concept of ‘event’ —
by which we mean something that occurs in a given place, at a given time (an
explosion, say, or a flash of light, or the coincidence of hands on a clock). But
26Specifying these spatiotemporal relations is crucial: without them we have no way of
distinguishing numerically distinct, but identical, events (such as two identical flashes of light
in different places). In this (rather Leibnizian) sense an event is really a global notion — to
specify it, we need to specify its relations with all other events.
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this description already makes intensive use of prerelativistic concepts, both in
its direct use of space and time language and in its reference to physical objects.
We could of course define events as crossing-points of world-lines, but now we
have either to explain what world-lines represent (surely impossible without our
prerelativistic language) or to return to uninterpreted mathematics (‘a world-
line is a smooth map of the real line into the four-manifold such that the metric
distance of any two points in the image is positive’, etc. ).27
However, one thing this discussion reminds us of is that our use of prerela-
tivistic intuitions does not require a global notion of space. We cannot say what
we mean by an event without any reference to the space/time split but we can
describe it with reference to space and time only in its vicinity.
As such we may understand relativistic spacetime by
1. breaking it up into small regions;
2. describing each region in terms of a (highly non-unique) space-time split
— i. e. a local version of many-instants;
3. giving the spatiotemporal relations between the regions.
The pure-event viewpoint can be understood as a limiting case of this interpre-
tation scheme, although in the limit we once again lose our ability to understand
the theory (as has been argued for in section 3).
This method of understanding relativistic spacetime has a number of advan-
tages over the use of globally defined instants: in particular it brings out the
arbitrariness of our choice of spatial slice at large distances and the irrelevance
of that choice in describing local phenomena, and it makes it clear that there is
no fact of the matter about what is happening now in distant regions of space.
However, it is not really a more “right” description of spacetime — the best
which we might be able to say about it is that it is a more useful description
of an entity whose perfect description as a physical system lies (at least for the
moment) beyond our ability to comprehend directly.
The set-of-events description of spacetime can be copied in the quantum case.
An (instantaneous) ‘event’ in quantum theory is specified by a (Heisenberg-
picture) projector (onto states for which, at the time at which the event is
supposed to occur, it does indeed occur with certainty). If events A,B are
described by Heisenberg projectors P̂A, P̂B respectively, then the probability of
event A occurring given that event B occurs is
Tr(P̂AP̂BρP̂BP̂A)
Tr(P̂BρP̂B)
.
27The subtleties of defining spatially and temporally extended events were recognised by
Einstein (1905), whose original discussion of special relativity refers in passing to
the imprecision that is inherent in the concept of simultaneity of two events
taking place at (approximately) the same location and that must be surmounted
by an abstraction.
The issue is discussed further by Saunders (1997).
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We are now in a position to regard the quantum state as (being described
by) the collection of events together with the spatiotemporal and probabilistic
relationships between them.
This relational view of Everett has been recently championed by Saun-
ders (1993, 1995, 1996b, 1997, 1998). As with the classical description of space-
time as events and spatiotemporal relations between them, it is in many ways
less arbitrary than using global ‘instants’ and ‘worlds’ but still relies on a (clas-
sical, pre-relativistic) concept of what an event is. Essentially the concept which
we import from our previous theories is that of a ‘local world’, i. e. a small spa-
tial region, at a single time, in which certain observables have definite values
(note the explicit need to choose a local simultaneity convention, for self-adjoint
projectors can project onto spatially extended events but not onto temporally
extended ones).28
9 Telling a Dynamical Story
The ‘local’ description given in the previous section would appear to have sig-
nificant advantages over the many-instants approach, in that it better captures
the notions of covariance and locality which are central to relativity. Should we
then abandon the many-instants description of section 7 in favour of the local
description?
We can see why such abandonment would be unwise when we consider the is-
sue of dynamics. We need the notion of a global foliation of spacetime (whether
we are doing classical or quantum physics) if we wish to discuss spacetime
physics as a dynamical system, and in particular if we wish to discuss issues
of determinism. A globally specified instant, together with the (classical or
Schro¨dinger) state at that instant, incorporates an important feature of our
prerelativistic theories which is less transparent in the local description: namely
that at any given moment of time we can specify the contents of space ev-
erywhere without having to worry that one region has causal influence upon
another, but that having done so, at later moments of time the contents of
space will be determined by the dynamics.
In discussing dynamics in relativity, we are again required to behave in this
way: we need to specify the matter distribution and its rate of change across a
spacelike surface (i. e. a choice of instant) which extends across the whole region
of interest (in principle across the whole universe) and then evolve this spacelike
surface forward in time (Wald 1984). There are, of course, a huge number of
different ways in which we may specify this time evolution, each generating
a different choice of spacetime foliation and hence a different ‘many-instants’
description of spacetime (this is the ‘many-fingered time’ of Misner, Thorne,
and Wheeler (1973)).
The covariance of relativity theory manifests itself in our ability to describe
28Recent work by Deutsch and Hayden (1999) on the Heisenberg picture in quantum com-
putation has given rise to some suggestions of another entirely local — and resolutely non-
classical — way to understand unitary quantum mechanics, but this work remains in its
infancy.
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a dynamical process equally validly by many different foliations. However, only
in the most stylised of dynamical processes in classical or quantum relativity
can we give such a description in a manifestly covariant way which makes no
use of a foliation29: the very concepts of ‘process’ and ‘dynamics’ depend upon
the notion of something taking place as time changes, and so cannot be given
without reference to time.
As such, if we wish to describe causal or dynamical processes in a given
region, we must make a space/time split which is global at least over that
region. So if we were describing the evolution of life on earth, for instance, we
may be able to restrict our slices to some neighbourhood of the solar system
— and indeed can get quite far by restricting them to a neighbourhood of the
Earth’s surface. Only when we do cosmology do we need to foliate the entire
spacetime.
How much freedom do we have in choosing our foliation, and our set of
worlds? For a large class of dynamical processes (essentially all those taking
place in our local vicinity, at macroscopic scales and low velocities) there is
(locally) a fairly well defined ‘best choice’ of foliation and of basis common to
all members of the class: the foliation picked out by Lorentz reference frames
co-moving with the Earth, and the basis picked out by decoherence. Many
other processes, while not sharing these choices, still have an obviously ‘best’
choice: for classical relativity, consider the atmospheric physics of a star moving
at relativistic speeds relative to us; in quantum physics, consider neutron inter-
ferometry with its fairly well-defined separate histories. Other processes again
cannot be properly understood until we have seen them described in several
distinct bases or foliations: consider:
• colliding shock-waves, where we need to consider both the centre-of-mass
viewpoint and that of an observer moving with the shock;
• gravitational collapse (Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler 1973), where both
the description from a surface co-moving with the collapsing star and the
description of a faraway observer give important insights;
• the two-slit experiment, which notoriously cannot fully be understood
from either a particle or a wave viewpoint;
• certain algorithms in quantum computation (Deutsch, Ekert, and Lupac-
chini 1999) (indeed, from a certain viewpoint every algorithm in quantum
computation, since quantum computers outpace classical computers partly
through not being forced to work in a fixed basis).
The moral is that we should not regard ‘local’ and ‘many-instants’ descriptions,
whether of classical or quantum physics, as rivals: rather, they illuminate dif-
29Contrast the two-body collisions of otherwise free particles (adequately described in terms
of world-lines) with computer models of supernovae (Arnett 1996), or the (admittedly com-
plex) scattering theory of asymptotically free relativistic quantum particles with the far more
intractable lattice simulations used to analyse non-perturbative quantum field theory (see
Kaku (1993) for an introduction).
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ferent aspects of the (classical or quantum) universe, and which one is used will
depend on the specific situation.
10 Summary: a Point-by-Point Comparison
The rich analogies between spacetime and the Everett interpretation stand out
clearly in the following table:
Relativity Everett
The Universe may be fully described as
a collection of instants and their tem-
poral relations.
The Universe may be fully described
as a collection of (fine-grained) worlds,
and their weights.
Such a description is arbitrary and fails
to show the full structure of spacetime.
Such a description is arbitrary and fails
to show the full structure of the multi-
verse.
The instants are theoretical constructs
and our thoughts do not supervene on
individual instants.
The worlds are theoretical constructs
and our thoughts do not supervene on
individual worlds.
Nonetheless our familiarity with our
pre-relativistic theories gives us a con-
ceptual grasp on the idea of ‘now’ and
an instant,which enables us to under-
stand what is described by spacetime.
Nonetheless our familiarity with our
pre-quantum theories gives us a concep-
tual grasp on the idea of a world which
enables us to understand what is de-
scribed by quantum theory.
Specifying only the collection of in-
stants without giving the temporal re-
lations between instants is insufficient
to tell us the spacetime.30
Specifying only the collection of worlds
without giving the amplitudes of each
world is insufficient to tell us the state.
We knowmathematically how to handle
spatiotemporal relations, and we have
a practical understanding of temporal
duration and flow, but these concepts
are philosophically problematic.
We know mathematically how to han-
dle amplitudes, and we have a practical
understanding of probability, but these
concepts are philosophically problem-
atic.
We may speak of ‘moments of time’ and
the number of moments of time (‘the
next moment’, etc. ) but this is just
a metaphor for temporal duration, and
cannot be interpreted literally.
We may speak of ‘number of worlds’ but
this is just a metaphor for the weight
of a given world, and cannot be inter-
preted literally.
30See Barbour and Bertotti (1977, 1982) and Barbour (1999), however, for further discussion
of this point from a Machian perspective.
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Relativity Everett
The theory is specified in a way which
makes no direct reference to observers,
but to understand why the Universe
seems as it does to us we need to
address certain observer-related prob-
lems — specifically we need to under-
stand our perceptions of the passage of
time.31
The theory is specified in a way which
makes no direct reference to observers,
but to understand why the Universe
seems as it does to us we need to ad-
dress certain observer-related problems
— specifically we need to understand
our perceptions of probability.
In everyday circumstances, there ex-
ists an (approximate) natural choice of
choice of spacetime foliation.31
In everyday circumstances, there exists
an (approximate) natural choice of ba-
sis.
The details of this foliation are arbi-
trary, both when examined closely and
with respect to spatially remote ar-
eas.31
The details of this basis are arbitrary,
both when examined closely and with
respect to spatially remote areas.
In describing the dynamics of a system
it is generally necessary for us to give
our description in terms of some choice
of foliation (i. e. instants).
In describing the dynamics of a system
it is generally necessary for us to give
our description in terms of some choice
of basis (i. e. worlds).
For some processes (such as a board-
room meeting or the dynamics of
the Solar System) there is an
approximately-defined ‘best’ choice
of foliation; for others (such as gravi-
tational collapse) different choices may
give different insights into the process.
For some processes (such as neutron
interferometry, or a Schro¨dinger’s Cat
experiment, or (possibly) making sense
of counterfactual reasoning) there is an
approximately defined ‘best’ choice of
worlds; for others (such as a quantum
computation) different choices may give
different insights into the process.
There is no fundamental notion of
an object’s persistence through time;
all we have are structural similarities
between regions of space at different
times.32
There is no fundamental notion of a
world’s persistence through time; all we
have are structural similarities between
parts of the state at different times.
However, in certain situations it may
be possible to recover a (pragmatic, ap-
proximately defined) notion of persis-
tence of objects from these structural
features.32
However, in certain situations it may
be possible to recover a (pragmatic, ap-
proximately defined) notion of persis-
tence of worlds from these structural
features.
31These matters are discussed further by Stein (1991).
32It seems likely that these notions apply to our own concept of personal identity as much
as to physical objects; see Parfit (1984) for a defence of this.
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Relativity Everett
We may describe the classical space-
time as a network of events together
with the spatiotemporal relations be-
tween the events.
We may describe the quantum space-
time as a network of events together
with the spatiotemporal and probabilis-
tic relations between the events.
Whether we describe spacetime in
terms of many global instants or in
terms of more localised events, we make
essential use of our intuitive concept
of a local spatial region — not in the
mathematical formulation of the theory
but in getting a conceptual grasp of it
and understanding our own place in it.
Whether we describe the quantum uni-
verse in terms of many global worlds or
in terms of more localised events, we
make essential use of our intuitive con-
cept of a local and value-definite (for
some observables) spatial region — not
in the mathematical formulation of the
theory but in getting a conceptual grasp
of it and understanding our own place
in it.
11 Conclusion
Are the worlds real? Yes, in the sense that instants of time are real: they may
not be present directly in the formalism, but unless we introduce the concept
we may struggle to understand what the formalism is telling us, and without
the concept it may be impossible to capture important (causal/deterministic)
properties of the world. Further, a description in terms of worlds (or instants
of time) is not incomplete, for we can certainly recover the universal state from
it; our only complaint with it is that it is somewhat arbitrary.
Are consistent histories, and worlds which persist over time, real? Yes, in
the sense that rivers, or animals, or persisting objects, are real: like worlds
or instants they are not directly present in the formalism, and unlike worlds
or instants they only approximately definable, but that is no reason why they
should not be seen as legitimate entities or used in our explanations (any more
than we should expect to be able to describe zoology in any useful or explanatory
way using only the language of quantum field theory).
We are undoubtedly more at home with Minkowski spacetime than with the
universal state. Partly this may be because we have worked with the concept
in physics for rather longer, but more importantly we have long been used to
the idea that multiple times exist (in some sense) — the innovation in relativity
theory is the unification of these instants into a whole, and the identification
of the instants as secondary concepts. Everett asks us to take both steps at
once: to accept that there exist many worlds,33 and then to fuse them together
into a whole and accept that the worlds are only secondary. Clearly this is
a significantly larger conceptual jump; still, if we are prepared to accept the
existence of many worlds and if we are happy with the step from many times to
33Of course, this is not a wholly new concept: whatever we may think of the metaphysical
status of possible worlds, we routinely describe them when we use counterfactuals.
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spacetime, there seems no reason to avoid a similar step in the case of quantum
theory.
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